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Abstract 
Game Theory: The Modern-Day Airline Dogfight 
Nathaniel Schattner 
Dr. Frank O’Connor 
Department of Government and Economics 
This study examines the narrowing differentiation between legacy airlines and low-cost 
carriers in the United States by exploring the competitive strategies each group borrows 
from one another. Specifically, this work examines the implementation of a new type of 
economy fare by Delta Air Lines, called basic economy, and evaluates how the fare has 
impacted a key metric of airline performance: domestic operating revenues.  
In the first part of this thesis, an explanation of the history behind airline marketing 
efforts as well as what constitutes a low-cost carrier and a legacy carrier is provided. A 
brief description of game theory is included as well. 
In the second part of this thesis, domestic operating revenues were gathered from the 
Bureau of Transport Statistics for each of the legacy carriers in the United States: Delta 
Air Lines, United Airlines, and American Airlines. Since only Delta had implemented a 
basic economy fare at the time of this research, Delta was used as the test variable 
while American Airlines and United Airlines were used as control variables. A regression 
was then performed on the data to analyze the significance of the results and account 
for seasonality. 
The data indicated that there was a strong correlation between Delta Air Lines’s growth 
in revenues and the introduction of its basic economy fare. Delta strongly outperformed 
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its legacy airline competitors in domestic operating revenue growth during this time 
period. Now, American and United are following Delta’s lead and introducing their own 
versions of a basic economy class.  
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Introduction 
On October 24, 1978, President Jimmy Carter signed into law one of the most 
profound and influential pieces of legislation to affect the United States airline industry: 
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. Focusing on competition and economic 
liberalization, this law introduced several significant changes to the way the United 
States airline industry operated. Previously, fares and flights were regulated by a central 
bureaucracy known as the Civil Aeronautics Board. As Wensveen (2011) notes, “airlines 
had a monopoly on certain routes and passengers were forced to fly certain airlines 
regardless of price or desire” (p. 274). Furthermore, many airlines had to operate 
inefficient flights, resulting in higher fares for their passengers. 
 However, as the law began to take effect through the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
airlines received greater flexibility in that they could choose the routes they wanted to 
fly and file the fares that they deemed appropriate. Competition and the free market 
structure resulted in lower airfares and airlines entering markets in which they 
previously had limited or no access. Some carriers performed well during this time 
period and evolved into what is known today as the legacy (network) carriers. Other 
carriers did not perform so well, and many of these airlines were bought by or merged 
with stronger carriers.  However, there were some new airlines that began to emerge, 
specifically in the low-cost carrier (LCC) market. These new carriers had lighter, less 
bureaucratic cost structures and began to compete with the legacy carriers for 
passengers, igniting fare wars and other competitive practices. Such competitive 
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strategies represent one of the key components of the complex system of airline 
economics. 
 The airline industry is an oligopoly, which is where a few firms offer either a 
similar or slightly differentiated product. Many economists have argued about the 
extent to which differentiation exists in the airline industry. Although nearly all experts 
in the industry would agree that an airline offers the same basic product (i.e., a safe, 
reliable seat to one’s destination of choice), others argue that airlines are able to 
distinguish their products through the services they offer their passengers. For instance, 
carriers have added various amenities in an attempt to woo passengers, such as Wi-Fi, 
seatback entertainment, food options, lounges, frequent flier programs, various types of 
seating and levels of comfort, etc.  
Indeed, airlines have had to change their marketing tactics throughout the 
decades, especially since deregulation. Airlines have now moved into the consumer-
oriented period in which carriers have molded their “services to meet consumer needs 
rather than molding consumer needs to fit the available services” (Wensveen, 2011, p. 
275). Before, airlines focused mainly on producing “services that reflected the 
operations and selling talents of the company” in what is known as the sales-oriented 
period (Wensveen, 2011, p. 275). 
 However, despite the efforts of airlines to differentiate the same basic product, 
most passengers still care primarily about one factor: price.  Wensveen (2011) asserts 
that this focus is hardly surprising given the fact that airlines operate in “an industry 
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with relatively few companies [in which] each [is] aware of the other’s pricing policies 
and [must] match the competition or lose market share (p. 282).  
What are Low-Cost Carriers? 
 One group of airlines has focused on the price-centric strategy more so than 
others: low-cost carriers (LCCs). In the United States, low-cost carriers include airlines 
such as JetBlue, Allegiant Air, Frontier Airlines, and Spirit Airlines. Many of these carriers 
have employed strategies to make their base fares as low as possible.  For instance, 
many new carriers have more economical and flexible operating structures and have 
pursued the strategy of “de-bundling” fares.  
De-bundling fares involves making the base fare of an airline ticket as cheap as 
possible by removing all of the free amenities a passenger would normally get and 
letting passengers select for themselves what amenities they do and do not want. This 
strategy is also known as a-la-carte pricing. For example, many airlines in this group 
have very inexpensive base fares, but will charge for items and services (i.e., ancillaries) 
such as checked baggage, carry-on baggage, printing a boarding pass, assigned seating, 
priority boarding, drinks, food, etc. The success of this strategy is largely explained by 
O’Connell and Williams (2011), who state that “the profit margins from ancillaries are 
much higher than the commodity-based sale of airline seats, with estimates of gross 
profit margins up to 40 per cent” (p. 148). Moreover, they highlight how “innovation in 
today’s airline industry has stemmed from the low-cost carrier business model” with 
one of its “pioneering developments [being] ancillary revenues” (O'Connell & Williams, 
2011, p. 148). 
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What are Legacy Carriers? 
 The other group of airlines is known as legacy or network carriers. The major 
examples of legacy carriers in the United States are Delta Air Lines, American Airlines, 
and United Airlines. These carriers for a long time included many of the amenities the 
low-cost carriers charged for; however, this has changed in recent years. Faced with 
soaring fuel costs, an economic recession, and competition from low-cost carriers within 
the last decade, the legacy carriers have begun to borrow many strategies from the low-
cost carriers in an attempt to boost market share and operating revenue. All of the 
legacy carriers now employ baggage fees for checked baggage and many are now 
charging for ancillaries such as priority boarding, snacks, and itinerary changes. 
What is Game Theory? 
Game theory is the framework that economics uses to understand how firms 
compete with one another. Game theory in economics works much like any sort of 
strategic recreational game, such as Monopoly®. As Frank and Bernanke (2009) write, 
the three basic elements of a game are “the players, the strategies available to each 
player, and the payoffs each player receives for each possible combination of strategies” 
(p.270). Similarly, in the airline industry, the three elements are the airlines, their 
competitive strategies, and the resulting revenues each airline receives from pursuing 
their strategies. 
Some firms may have dominant strategies, or a strategy “that yields a higher 
payoff no matter what the other players in a game choose” (Frank & Bernanke, 2009, p. 
271). Other times a business’s plan is dependent on the actions of another firm. Factors 
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such as preferences, timing, and assumptions about what other firms may or may not 
do can also influence the actions a business will decide to take. More information 
regarding the strategy of the basic economy fare will be discussed near the conclusion 
of this paper. 
Basic Economy and Delta Air Lines 
Many legacy carriers still tend to have higher base fares than low-cost carriers 
(Ros, 2016). As a result, legacy airlines have started to enact increased seat 
segmentation. Rather than just the traditional first, business, and economy seating 
arrangements, carriers are now introducing classes between these levels, such as a basic 
economy or a premium economy class.  
Delta Air Lines has pioneered the development of the basic economy fare among 
legacy carriers. This fare is cheaper and more restrictive than the traditional economy, 
or “Main Cabin,” fare offered by Delta. (Delta Air Lines, n.d.). For example, passengers 
flying in this class may not upgrade, reserve an assigned seat, or change their itinerary 
(Delta Air Lines, n.d.). By having a lower base fare, Delta can attract more price-sensitive 
customers as well as compete for market share against the low-cost carriers. In fact, 
Delta promotes its basic economy fare as its “value-fare product for price-driven 
customers” (Delta Air Lines, n.d.) The basic economy fare is proving successful as legacy 
competitors to Delta, such as United and American, have recently announced the 
implementation of basic economy products on a selection of routes beginning in spring 
of 2017 (Mutzabaugh, 2017). 
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Figure 1: A screenshot from Delta’s website showing fare segmentation from Lexington, KY to Atlanta, GA 
Methodology 
Given this recent development by other carriers, it is obvious qualitatively that 
Delta Air Lines must be having success with this new fare level. However, is the fare 
proving successful via quantitative measures? Using publicly available data from the 
Bureau of Transport Statistics (a division of the Department of Transportation), an 
analysis of operating revenues will be conducted to see if changes in the revenues are 
representative of the success of Delta’s basic economy fare. The analysis will focus 
solely on domestic operating revenue data, as basic economy fares are primarily offered 
on domestic routes. Since Delta introduced the fare in March of 2012, years before the 
other legacy carriers in spring of 2017, it will serve as an ideal test variable whereas the 
other two legacy carriers (United and American) will serve as control variables. The 
three legacy carriers were also subject to similar macroeconomic conditions throughout 
this time period, making this analysis an ideal experiment. A regression analysis will be 
used to further explore the validity of the relationship between Delta’s domestic 
operating revenues and the introduction of its basic economy fare. 
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Domestic Operating Revenues 
Initial Data Findings 
One of the best ways to evaluate a carrier’s financial performance is through its 
operating revenues, which is the sales generated from a company’s day-to-day 
activities. For an airline, this is the revenue it brings in from ticket sales, ancillary fees 
(e.g., baggage fees, food sales, priority boarding, etc.), and cargo on its flights. 
Therefore, the following analysis will determine if the advent of Delta’s basic economy 
fare has had any effect, positive or negative, on Delta’s domestic operating revenues. 
Using data from the Bureau of Transport Statistics (2016), data from the first 
quarter of 2011 through the third quarter of 2016 are displayed for Delta Air Lines, 
American Airlines, and United Airlines. Data are input into the graph based on the last 
month of each quarter. 
 
Graph 1: Domestic Operating Revenues of Delta, American, and United from 2011Q1-2016Q3 
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Data Smoothing 
However, with the above graph (Graph 1), there are several large spikes. United 
Airlines’s operating revenues spikes around March of 2012, and American Airlines’s 
operating revenue spikes around October of 2015. These points represent the times at 
which these carriers completed a merger with another carrier and/or started reporting 
jointly. United Airlines fully merged with Continental Airlines in March of 2012, and US 
Airways fully merged with American Airlines in April of 2015. Therefore, to help reduce 
this discrepancy in the data, data from Continental Airlines and US Airways were added 
to United Airlines and American Airlines respectively before they each completed their 
mergers. For example, US Airways’s domestic operating revenue was combined with 
American Airlines’s domestic operating revenue from the first quarter of 2011 to the 
second quarter of 2015. By the third quarter of 2015, both carriers were reporting their 
data together as American Airlines. The revised chart is displayed below in Graph 2. (The 
data table for the graphed domestic operating revenues is available in Appendix 1.) 
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Graph 2: Revised Domestic Operating Revenue Graph Incorporating Data from Airlines Pre-Merger 
Statistical Analysis 
  Since the implementation of Delta’s basic economy in March of 2012 (vertical 
black line in graphs), Delta’s domestic operating revenues have continued to grow. 
Although the combined American domestic operating revenue exceeds Delta Air Lines’s 
domestic operating revenue until June of 2015 (2015Q2), Delta’s domestic operating 
revenue is consistently above the domestic operating revenue of the combined United 
Airlines. Unlike the combined United Airlines, whose trend is essentially flat, a clear 
growth can be observed in Delta’s trendline.  
It is important to focus on the time period following Delta’s implementation of 
its basic economy fare in March of 2012 (2012Q2). A regression analysis was conducted 
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from the four-year period 2012Q2-2016Q2 using the statistical software EViews. The 
regression data and graphs are displayed below. 
 
Graph 3: Delta Air Lines Regression Analysis 2012Q2-2016Q2 
 
Table 1: Delta Air Lines Regression Analysis 2012Q2-2016Q2 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TIME 77934.84 18169.65 4.289286 0.0006
C 5476225. 269499.5 20.31998 0.0000
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Graph 4: Combined American Airlines Regression Analysis 2012Q2-2016Q2 
 
Table 2: Combined American Airlines Regression Analysis 2012Q2-2016Q2 
 
  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TIME 15738.51 20138.96 0.781496 0.4467
C 6320045. 298709.1 21.15786 0.0000
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Graph 5: Combined United Airlines Regression Analysis 2012Q2-2016Q2 
 
Table 3: Combined United Airlines Regression Analysis 2012Q2-2016Q2 
  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TIME -241.1667 18956.79 -0.012722 0.9900
C 5497942. 281174.7 19.55348 0.0000
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Statistical Analysis Conclusions 
Although the R2 values are not significant for the domestic operating revenues of 
the combined American Airlines (0.04) and combined United Airlines (0.00), the R2 value 
for Delta’s trendline variable is significant (0.55). Moreover, Delta’s p-value is 0.0006, 
which means that the null hypothesis1 should be rejected (since the p-value is less than 
0.05) and that therefore this data is significant.  
Delta’s slope coefficient of $77,934,840 per quarter is also the highest of the 
three carriers as well, indicating that Delta had the most positive growth in this time 
period as opposed to the other network (legacy) carriers.  The combined American 
Airlines had a modest growth rate per quarter whereas the performance of the 
combined United Airlines was essentially flat. Therefore, this analysis thus reveals that 
there is a significant correlation between Delta’s domestic operating revenue and the 
implementation of its basic economy Fare. 
Statistical Analysis – Seasonality  
 When looking at the trendlines displayed in the above graphs, the quarterly 
domestic operating revenues of the three legacy carriers are very seasonal. To adjust for 
this seasonal variation, quarterly seasonal dummies were added into the regression 
equation to determine the validity of the introduction of Delta’s basic economy fare 
when factoring in seasonality. The seasonally-adjusted graphs are displayed below: 
                                                             
1 In layman’s terms, the null hypothesis represents the chance that a trendline is due to random 
chance/variables rather than a specific factor. 
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Graph 6: Delta Air Lines Seasonally-Adjusted Regression Analysis 2012Q2-2016Q2
2
 
 
    
Table 4: Delta Air Lines Seasonally-Adjusted Regression Analysis 2012Q2-2016Q2 
 
  
                                                             
2
 Note: All graphs are in thousands of dollars. On the regression analyses, change in domestic operating 
revenues is on the left vertical axis, and the quarterly domestic operating revenues are on the right 
vertical axis. 
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Residual Actual Fitted
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TIME 84832.42 6576.816 12.89871 0.0000
SPRING 758385.3 88482.01 8.571068 0.0000
SUMMER 703553.3 93935.72 7.489732 0.0000
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Graph 7: American Airlines Seasonally-Adjusted Regression Analysis 2012Q2-2016Q2 
 
 
Table 5: American Airlines Seasonally-Adjusted Regression Analysis 2012Q2-2016Q2 
 
  
-800,000
-600,000
-400,000
-200,000
0
200,000
400,000
600,000
5,600,000 
6,000,000 
6,400,000 
6,800,000 
7,200,000 
7,600,000 
II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Residual Actual Fitted
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TIME 19680.50 16638.94 1.182798 0.2598
SPRING 668068.3 223854.1 2.984392 0.0114
SUMMER 402083.0 237651.6 1.691901 0.1164
FALL 148332.0 235897.7 0.628798 0.5413
C 5938857. 299962.8 19.79865 0.0000
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Graph 8: United Airlines Seasonally-Adjusted Regression Analysis 2012Q2-2016Q2 
 
 
Table 6: United Airlines Seasonally-Adjusted Regression Analysis 2012Q2-2016Q2 
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2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Residual Actual Fitted
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TIME 8042.865 6696.206 1.201108 0.2529
SPRING 812007.5 90088.24 9.013468 0.0000
SUMMER 844971.2 95640.95 8.834826 0.0000
FALL 376518.1 94935.11 3.966058 0.0019
C 4855731. 120717.6 40.22390 0.0000
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The resulting data was very significant for Delta Air Lines as its p-value was 
barely above zero and therefore the null hypothesis can again be rejected. While the 
predictable seasonal trend is there, the seasonality and operating revenues are fairly 
independent of one another for Delta Air Lines as observed by its strong positive trend 
after the seasonal dummies were incorporated into the regression equation. Moreover, 
since Delta’s trend is continuous, the data indicates that Delta’s growth here is more 
than just a one-time shift. As seen from the tables above, the regression trend variable 
is not significant for either American Airlines or United Airlines. 
Expansion of Data Range to Period before Implementation of Delta’s Basic 
Economy  
However, what if the data range were expanded to include the time before Delta 
Air Lines implemented its basic economy fare? A separate regression analysis was 
performed from the period 2011Q1 (approximately one year before) to 2016Q3 (end of 
available data at the time of this research) to see if carriers’ results would differ 
markedly from the previous analysis (2012Q2-2016Q2).  
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Graph 9: Delta Air Lines Seasonally-Adjusted Regression Analysis 2011Q1-2016Q3 
 
 
Table 7: Delta Air Lines Seasonally-Adjusted Regression Analysis 2011Q1-2016Q3 
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TIME 75415.14 4574.558 16.48578 0.0000
SPRING 729600.5 83644.81 8.722604 0.0000
SUMMER 608475.9 84019.24 7.242101 0.0000
FALL 152906.6 87715.49 1.743211 0.0984
C 5104939. 77587.88 65.79557 0.0000
Schattner 26 
 
Graph 10: American Airlines Seasonally-Adjusted Regression Analysis 2011Q1-2016Q3 
 
 
Table 8: American Airlines Seasonally-Adjusted Regression Analysis 2011Q1-2016Q3 
 
  
-1,000,000
-750,000
-500,000
-250,000
0
250,000
500,000
5,500,000 
6,000,000 
6,500,000 
7,000,000 
7,500,000 
I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III
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Residual Actual Fitted
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TIME 39821.83 10065.27 3.956359 0.0009
SPRING 633368.5 184041.3 3.441448 0.0029
SUMMER 476591.5 184865.2 2.578049 0.0190
FALL 140775.8 192997.9 0.729416 0.4751
C 5657288. 170714.4 33.13890 0.0000
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Graph 11: United Airlines Seasonally-Adjusted Regression Analysis 2011Q1-2016Q3 
 
 
Table 9: United Airlines Seasonally-Adjusted Regression Analysis 2011Q1-2016Q3 
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Residual Actual Fitted
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
TIME 3858.410 3768.643 1.023819 0.3195
SPRING 826984.1 68908.82 12.00114 0.0000
SUMMER 880875.7 69217.29 12.72624 0.0000
FALL 399248.5 72262.36 5.524986 0.0000
C 4910950. 63918.97 76.83087 0.0000
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As seen on the data table and graphs above, while both American Airlines and 
Delta Air Lines both have growth and statistical significance in their trend variables for 
this expanded period of time (2011Q1-2016Q3), United Airlines does not. However, as 
keeping with the previous analysis, Delta Air Lines’s growth in domestic operating 
revenues still significantly outpaces the domestic operating revenues of American 
Airlines. 
Insights Regarding the Implementation of Other Legacy Carriers’ 
Basic Economy Fares 
Thesis 
Although it is not possible to prove causation, there is a strong correlation 
between the enactment of Delta Air Lines’s basic economy in the second quarter of 
2012 and the growth in its domestic operating revenues from that time until the second 
quarter of 2016. It is evident that this strategy is indeed working for Delta given its 
positive growth in domestic operating revenues, the airline’s maintained use of the 
tactic, and the recent adoption of the fare by other legacy carriers in spring of 2017 
(Mutzabaugh, 2017).  
The Role of Game Theory 
Given Delta’s apparent success in deploying the basic economy fare, why have 
the other two legacy carriers waited so long to employ such a policy? Typically, airlines 
are very responsive when it comes to responding to price changes in the marketplace. 
When one carrier raises prices, another airline will follow the former’s lead within a day 
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or even within a few hours, or if the other does not follow through, the first carrier will 
back off.  
The delay of Delta’s legacy airline competitors may have had to do with their 
organizational states at the time. In March of 2012, United Airlines had finally 
incorporated Continental Airlines into its operating structure as part of the carriers’ 
planned merger in 2010 (Elliott, 2012). Similarly, in February of 2013, American Airlines 
and US Airways announced that they would also merge; however, they were not fully 
integrated until April of 2015 (Karp, 2015).  
Perhaps United Airlines and American Airlines were so preoccupied with 
resolving complications from their respective mergers (e.g., labor agreements, operating 
structures, polices, computer systems, etc.) that they had no time to focus on enacting 
new and untested strategies like a basic economy fare. Delta Air Lines then took 
advantage of their preoccupations to focus on enacting a new, profitable strategy that 
would set them ahead of their legacy competitors (i.e., first mover advantage).  
Or, perhaps it may have been a simpler reason…perhaps American and United 
doubted that the strategy would work or that the amount of time, complexity, and 
effort involved to overhaul their pricing structure would not be feasible. Then, as a 
second mover, they would be able to respond by either offering “a product that [would] 
differ markedly from [the] existing product” or “mimic [an] existing product closely” 
(Frank & Bernanke, 2009, p. 285). One could therefore conclude that the basic economy 
fare strategy represents an economic game in which timing matters. 
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Now that both American Airlines and United Airlines are in more stable 
conditions, they likely feel more comfortable at deploying new strategies that compete 
with Delta’s. However, it is important to reiterate that both American’s and United’s 
basic economy fares have only been employed on a select variety of routes, which may 
indicate some residual uncertainty surrounding the new tactic (Mutzabaugh, 2017).  
Delta may still have the first mover advantage in this area and thus has more 
experience in knowing what modifications are necessary in order to ensure higher 
utilization and profit maximization. Since Delta’s basic economy fares were 
implemented years ago, Delta also has the lead in market penetration in that more 
consumers are aware of Delta’s basic economy offering than of American’s and United’s 
basic economy products. Delta has another advantage in that its basic economy fare is 
less restrictive than the basic economy products of United and American, which would 
consequently better appeal to customers looking the try the basic economy option.  
It appears as though United and American have incorporated some elements of 
both of the aforementioned options that are available to second movers in pursuing a 
strategy. Both carriers mimicked Delta’s basic economy fare and differentiated their 
product, but not markedly so.  The main difference in the basic economy offerings of 
American and United is that they are more restrictive than Delta’s (Creswell, 2017). 
Specifically, both carriers do not permit carry-on bags other than one personal item 
(Mutzabaugh, 2017). 
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Conclusion 
 Although there was a strong positive correlation between Delta Air Line’s basic 
economy and its quarterly domestic operating revenue, there are still many more areas 
for research. The Bureau of Transport Statistics offers an extensive database of 
information about carriers’ load factors, passenger numbers, net income, and airfares. It 
would be fascinating to evaluate the influence of tactics, such as Delta’s basic economy 
fare, on these other dependent variables. For instance, is the growth of Delta’s domestic 
operating revenues better explained by improved confidence and more passengers 
flying rather than the development of the basic economy fare?3 Although some 
preliminary data gathering, graphing, and analysis were performed by the author, 
including such a heavy amount of data and research would surpass the scope of this 
paper.  
Another interesting facet to analyze in airline game theory is the implementation 
of legacy carrier strategies by low-cost carriers (in contrast to legacy airlines borrowing 
tactics from low-cost carriers). For instance, JetBlue, a low-cost carrier based out of New 
York City, has adopted a premium business class product on a select number of 
transcontinental flights called Mint (JetBlue Airways, n.d.). Mint offers premium 
amenities such as lie-flat seats, expanded entertainment options, priority boarding and 
check-in lanes, quality refreshments and meals, and even a subsection of seats that are 
suites with their own door (JetBlue Airways, n.d.). Typically low-cost carriers appeal 
                                                             
3
 It is important to note that while passenger numbers are quick to find and are easily available, they are 
not the best source for evaluating the performance of an airline. For instance, passenger numbers are 
easily influenced by external factors such as seasonality and economic growth. 
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solely to the price-sensitive consumer and not to the business or high-end consumer, so 
legacy airline strategies adopted by low-cost carriers, such as JetBlue’s Mint, merit study 
as well.  
 
Figure 2: JetBlue's Mint Product (JetBlue Airways, n.d.) 
Like always, the airline industry is in a constant state of change. Faced with high 
barriers to entry and intense competition in addition to being subject to an ever-
changing economy, airlines must continue to find innovative ways to compete. Legacy 
airlines and low-cost carriers were once considered to occupy separate spheres; 
however, as each group of carriers borrows strategies from the other, the lines dividing 
the two groups of airlines become increasingly blurred. As these atypical tactics for each 
group prove themselves to be highly successful, expect to see newly borrowed 
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strategies as well as continued integration and less-defined segmentation between the 
different players in the airline travel industry. 
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Appendix 1 – Domestic Operating Revenues 
Table 10: Domestic Operating Revenues (Source: Bureau of Transport Statistics) 
Month 
(Arranged by 
end of 
Quarter) 
Delta Domestic 
Operating 
Revenue 
(Thousands of 
Dollars)  
Combined United 
Domestic Operating 
Revenue 
(Thousands of 
Dollars)  
Combined American 
Domestic Operating 
Revenue (Thousands 
of Dollars)  
Mar-11  $     5,124,733   $        4,864,314   $           5,536,452  
Jun-11  $     5,960,970   $        5,803,717   $           6,198,851  
Sep-11  $     6,003,561   $        5,912,162   $           6,068,264  
Dec-11  $     5,554,952   $        5,403,100   $           5,928,766  
Mar-12  $     5,595,586   $        4,950,545   $           6,099,260  
Jun-12  $     6,372,974   $        5,742,548   $           6,609,931  
Sep-12  $     6,116,001   $        5,567,124   $           6,124,921  
Dec-12  $     5,760,749   $        5,062,162   $           6,020,032  
Mar-13  $     5,669,954   $        5,022,297   $           6,195,561  
Jun-13  $     6,351,146   $        5,764,923   $           6,586,440  
Sep-13  $     6,566,795   $        5,792,667   $           6,520,724  
Dec-13  $     6,132,965   $        5,520,085   $           6,418,145  
Mar-14  $     6,027,647   $        5,005,587   $           6,565,098  
Jun-14  $     7,052,763   $        5,916,608   $           7,315,450  
Sep-14  $     7,071,849   $        5,967,101   $           7,002,669  
Dec-14  $     6,620,861   $        5,430,697   $           6,687,419  
Mar-15  $     6,468,745   $        4,912,020   $           6,493,706  
Jun-15  $     7,314,080   $        5,758,574   $           6,974,653  
Sep-15  $     7,267,623   $        5,894,146   $           6,738,831  
Dec-15  $     6,744,609   $        5,366,453   $           6,325,267  
Mar-16  $     6,720,368   $        4,965,592   $           5,681,892  
Jun-16  $     7,385,194   $        5,719,040   $           6,925,786  
Sep-16  $     7,137,041   $        5,918,710   $           7,453,971  
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Appendix 2 – Domestic Load Factors 
Table 11: Domestic Load Factors (Source: Bureau of Transport Statistics) 
Month-Year Delta Air Lines United Airlines 
American 
Airlines 
Jan-11 76.85 80.42 75.67 
Feb-11 79.06 81.85 77.43 
Mar-11 85.21 85.35 82.36 
Apr-11 84.93 86.2 83.50 
May-11 86.62 87.85 86.27 
Jun-11 87.92 89.93 87.90 
Jul-11 89.53 90.57 88.66 
Aug-11 88.44 89.07 86.22 
Sep-11 84.42 87.13 82.20 
Oct-11 85.77 87.59 85.29 
Nov-11 85.16 86.39 84.90 
Dec-11 82.19 85.36 81.46 
Jan-12 79.52 81.13 78.36 
Feb-12 81.45 80.14 78.42 
Mar-12 88.05 84.97 84.51 
Apr-12 87.14 85.85 85.16 
May-12 86.85 86.49 85.80 
Jun-12 89.21 87.62 89.13 
Jul-12 89.59 88.43 88.58 
Aug-12 89 88.64 87.43 
Sep-12 81.77 82.11 81.03 
Oct-12 86.33 85.86 84.56 
Nov-12 84.53 83.78 83.29 
Dec-12 82.76 83.41 81.84 
Jan-13 80.59 82.41 80.17 
Feb-13 82.48 83.31 81.31 
Mar-13 87.01 86.84 85.48 
Apr-13 84.57 85.23 85.37 
May-13 86.14 86.77 86.52 
Jun-13 87.97 88.92 89.22 
Jul-13 87.67 88.47 88.85 
Aug-13 87.1 88.74 86.38 
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Month-Year Delta Air Lines United Airlines 
American 
Airlines 
Sep-13 82.39 83.58 80.58 
Oct-13 83.68 84.41 84.08 
Nov-13 80.18 82.24 80.56 
Dec-13 86.32 88.01 84.86 
Jan-14 82.22 83.97 80.78 
Feb-14 84.74 84.32 82.67 
Mar-14 87.96 86.99 85.46 
Apr-14 87.69 87.12 86.52 
May-14 88.51 87.74 87.61 
Jun-14 89.28 88.6 89.01 
Jul-14 90.11 88.38 89.24 
Aug-14 88.67 89.17 87.89 
Sep-14 84.5 83.72 82.25 
Oct-14 86.7 83.99 84.84 
Nov-14 83.82 82.21 80.67 
Dec-14 85.24 85.8 81.96 
Jan-15 81.17 83.15 79.66 
Feb-15 84.86 83.83 83.24 
Mar-15 88.56 86 84.70 
Apr-15 87.22 86.06 84.50 
May-15 87.9 86.41 85.42 
Jun-15 89.82 87.76 88.92 
Jul-15 89.61 88.97 89.93 
Aug-15 87.96 88.56 88.69 
Sep-15 86.05 85.39 85.71 
Oct-15 89 87.16 88.45 
Nov-15 86.92 85.4 85.27 
Dec-15 86.07 85.59 84.83 
Jan-16 83.11 83.67 82.41 
Feb-16 82.29 81.55 81.40 
Mar-16 87.02 85.04 85.61 
Apr-16 86.37 84.43 84.70 
May-16 87.73 86.52 86.10 
Jun-16 88.64 89.47 88.19 
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Month-Year Delta Air Lines United Airlines 
American 
Airlines 
Jul-16 87.31 88.88 87.35 
Aug-16 84.23 86.61 84.78 
Sep-16 86.28 85 84.76 
Oct-16 88.14 85.89 85.70 
 
